# 1nc

## 1

#### Security is a psychological construct—the aff’s scenarios for conflict are products of paranoia that project our violent impulses onto the other

**Mack 91** – Doctor of Psychiatry and a professor at Harvard University (John, “The Enemy System” http://www.johnemackinstitute.org/eJournal/article.asp?id=23 \*Gender modified)

The threat of nuclear annihilation **has** stimulated us to **try to** understand what it is about (hu)mankind that has led to such self-destroying behavior. Central to this **inquiry** is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war **should it occur,** has always arisen**.** Enmity **between groups of people** stems from the interaction of psychological**, economic, and cultural** elements. These include fear and hostility **(which are often closely related),** competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group **or cause,[4]** a tendency to disclaim **and assign** elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses **and intentions,** and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation **by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest.** A full understanding of the "enemy system"[3] requires insights from **many specialities, including** psychology**, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty** social and behavioral scientists**, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war,** declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding (hu)man(s) as an innately aggressive **animal,** inevitably committed to war**. The Seville statement implies that** we have real choices**. It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age:** threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. **The Real and the Created Enemy** Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with responses on the following lines: "I can accept psychological explanations of things, but my enemy is real**.** The Russians **[or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans]** are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm**. Furthermore,** there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values **between our two nations.** It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of military and political power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness". This **argument** does not address the distinction between the **enemy** threat and one's own contribution to that threat**-by distortions of perception, provocative words, and actions. In short,** the enemy is real, but we have not learned to understand how we have created that enemy**,** or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. "We never see our enemy's motives **and we never labor to assess his will,** with anything approaching objectivity**".[6] Individuals may have little to do with the choice of national enemies. Most Americans, for example, know only what has been reported in the mass media about the Soviet Union.** We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us**. Ill-will and a desire for revenge are transmitted from one generation to another, and** we are not taught to think critically about how our assigned enemies are selected for us. **In the relations between potential adversarial nations there will have been, inevitably, real grievances that are grounds for enmity. But the attitude of one people towards another is usually determined by leaders who manipulate the minds of citizens for domestic political reasons which are generally unknown to the public. As Israeli sociologist Alouph Haveran has said,** in times of conflict between nations historical accuracy is the first victim.[8] **The Image of the Enemy and How We Sustain It Vietnam veteran William Broyles wrote: "**War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy**."[9] But** to sustain that idea **in war and peacetime** a nation's leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities**, though not necessarily recognized as such by the governing elites that provide raw material** upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7,**10]** Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups**. This surrender takes place in both totalitarian and democratic societies, and without coercion. Leaders can therefore designate outside enemies and take actions against them with little opposition. Much further research is needed to understand the** psychological mechanisms **that** impel individuals to kill or allow killing **in their name, often** with little questioning of the morality or consequences of such actions**. Philosopher and psychologist Sam Keen asks why it is that in virtually every war "The enemy is seen as less than human? He's faceless. He's an animal"." Keen tries to answer his question: "**The image of the enemy **is not only the soldier's most powerful weapon; it** is society's most powerful weapon. It enables people en masse to participate in acts of violence **they would never consider doing as individuals".[12] National leaders become skilled in presenting the adversary in dehumanized images. The mass media, taking their cues from the leadership, contribute powerfully to the process.**

#### Our response is to interrogate the epistemological failures of the 1ac---this is the only way to solve inevitable extinction

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While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad.

The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question.

As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves.

There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them.

Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation.

Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

## 2

#### Government shutdown won’t happen, but it’ll be close—Obama’s capital is key

Desjardins 9/26 **–** Capitol Hill Reporter for CNN (Analysis: Why a government shutdown (Probably) wont happen, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/26/politics/analysis-shutdown-chances/?hpt=hp_t2>)

Washington (CNN) -- No science or religion can accurately predict what will happen in Congress.¶ But looking plainly at the political chess board and listening to sources on Capitol Hill, there is plenty of reason to think that a shutdown of the federal government won't happen, at least not next week.¶ Here's why:¶ Politics. And blame. And 1996.¶ "Let's put it this way," Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, told CNN. "I'm not about to shut down the government and have Republicans take the blame for it. It's just that simple."¶ Photos: The last government shutdown¶ Who loses if the government shuts down? Where is GOP's alternative to Obamacare? Bill Clinton on Ted Cruz¶ Bluntly, many Republicans fear they will be blamed for a shutdown, just months before a big congressional election year. This makes them highly motivated to find a way to keep government running. A CNN/ORC poll in mid-September showed 51% of people would hold Republicans in Congress responsible for a shutdown versus 40% for President Barack Obama.¶ House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, might already be in this camp. He initially proposed a spending bill that would have avoided a standoff. Conservatives forced him to go to war with a different version fully defunding Obamacare, but Boehner's opening move was an important signal that he wants to sidestep a shutdown.¶ Main Street fed up over Beltway shutdown battle¶ There may be some learned behavior from history here, too. "I saw this movie before, I saw what happened before," said Sen. John McCain, R-Arizona, talking about the sting Republicans felt after the shutdowns in 1995 and 1996. "That's what happened the last time we tried this," he concluded.¶ Bottom line: Ideal or not, Congress runs on political currency. And multiple House GOP aides tell CNN that the majority of the Republicans in their conference fear a shutdown would cost them with voters.¶ The next fights¶ Republicans are divided over how far to take the Obamacare battle right now. And GOP leaders also are preparing a second Obamacare fight during the upcoming debt ceiling debate. So, they have the option of dropping the anti-Obamacare push from the shutdown debate now and instead including it in the debt ceiling fight coming up.¶ At the same time, Democrats are eager to get past the shutdown debate so they can move on to the debt ceiling and start to deal with yet another fight: budget cuts slated to hit in January at the latest.¶ The numbers¶ Republicans have 233 members in the House, 16 votes more than a majority. Those 233 are divided over how far to take the Obamacare fight, over whether to ultimately shut down government in the name of defunding the health care law.¶ Facebook users mentioned 'Obamacare' 300,000 times in the U.S. and 360,000 times globally, according to data from the site. Here is a breakdown of those Facebook users.¶ This year, funding measures repeatedly have passed the House of Representatives with a bipartisan coalition. Take a look at the Superstorm Sandy funding vote. Or the last debt ceiling increase. Or the March vote to avoid a government shutdown. Sure, every vote is different. But a bipartisan safety net has magically rolled out during the last funding standoffs.¶ Deadline pressure¶ Something happens in the day or two before a potential shutdown. Whatever the atmosphere and seemingly-firm positioning now, things will ramp up fast if Congress gets closer to a shutdown, especially a shutdown that would go in place during a work week.¶ Workers ask if they will be sent home without pay. Troops (and their families) worry if their paychecks will be delayed. Families may start to cancel vacations. That is the moment when incredible political pressure against a shutdown builds.¶ The deadline itself¶ Finally, we come to a public secret. The government does not necessarily have to shut down at the end of the day on September 30. Yes, at midnight, funding officially runs out for most programs. But if lawmakers are close to a deal, the president can order agencies to keep running for a few hours or perhaps even a day or two for Congress to pass the legislation.¶ CNN Fact Checks: Obamacare¶ This has happened before. Recently.¶ At midnight at the end of April 8, 2011, the funding for most agencies officially ran out. But Democrats and Republicans had struck a funding deal a few hours before, it just had not passed through Congress yet. So the Obama administration told agencies to hold off with any shutdown plans because a spending bill was likely to become law soon. In that case, it waived just a few hours of shutdown, but sources in both parties at the Capitol have confirmed that the president can do this for a longer period if a deal is emerging.¶ Again, Congress works best on deadlines, and the shutdown deadline is not quite as firm as people might think.¶ Why a shutdown (still) might happen¶ All this said, you cannot underestimate the swirling, unpredictable dynamics in Congress at the moment and Republicans' gut-level objections to Obamacare.¶ Once the Senate passes its version of a spending bill, House Republicans are considering attaching another item to it. That could be a one-year delay in the individual insurance mandate in Obamacare, a repeal of a medical device tax, a change in how the government handles congressional employee health plans or possibly something in support of the Keystone pipeline.¶ How this affects you¶ A spending bill with something Republicans want and Democrats don't would set up a late game of chicken between the House, Senate and president. If no one blinks, which is possible, this would lead to a shutdown. It's unclear whether House Republicans will do this. It is also unclear how Democrats would react.¶ But this scenario is the reason there is still a chance a shutdown could happen.

#### The plan causes an inter-branch fight that derails Obama’s agenda

Douglas Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 67-69

Raising or Lowering Political Costs by Affecting Presidential Political Capital Shaping both real and anticipated public opinion are two important ways in which Congress can raise or lower the political costs of a military action for the president. However, focusing exclusively on opinion dynamics threatens to obscure the much broader political consequences of domestic reaction—particularly congressional opposition—to presidential foreign policies. At least since Richard Neustadt's seminal work Presidential Power, presidency scholars have warned that **costly political battles in one policy arena frequently have significant ramifications for presidential power in other realms**. Indeed, two of Neustadt's three "cases of command"—Truman's seizure of the steel mills and firing of General Douglas MacArthur—explicitly discussed the broader political consequences of stiff domestic resistance to presidential assertions of commander-in-chief powers. In both cases, Truman emerged victorious in the case at hand—yet, Neustadt argues, each victory cost Truman dearly in terms of his future power prospects and leeway in other policy areas, many of which were more important to the president than achieving unconditional victory over North Korea." While congressional support leaves the president's reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. **Political capital spent shoring up support for a president's foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives**. Moreover, any weakening in the president's political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races." Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War.6° In addition to boding ill for the president's perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson's dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking both the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush's **highest second-term domestic priorities**, such as Social Security and immigration reform, **failed** perhaps in large part **because the administration had to expend so much energy** and effort **waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics** of the war in Iraq. When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If **congressional opposition in the military arena stands to** derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena

#### That spills-over to government shutdown and US default—that kills the economy and US credibility

Norm Ornstein, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 9/1/13, Showdowns and Shutdowns, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/01/showdowns\_and\_shutdowns\_syria\_congress\_obama

Then there is the overload of business on the congressional agenda when the two houses return on Sept. 9 -with only nine legislative days scheduled for action in the month. We have serious confrontations ahead on spending bills and the debt limit, as the new fiscal year begins on Oct. 1 and the debt ceiling approaches just a week or two thereafter. Before the news that we would drop everything for an intense debate on whether to strike militarily in Syria, Congress-watchers were wondering how we could possibly deal with the intense bargaining required to avoid one or more government shutdowns and/or a real breach of the debt ceiling, **with** devastating consequences for American credibility **and the** international economy. Beyond the deep policy and political divisions, Republican congressional leaders will likely use both a shutdown and the debt ceiling as hostages to force the president to cave on their demands for deeper spending cuts. **Avoiding this end-game bargaining will require** the unwavering attention of the same top leaders in the executive and legislative branches who will be deeply enmeshed in the Syria debate. The possibility -even probability -of disruptions caused by partial shutdowns could complicate any military actions. The possibility is also great that the rancor that will accompany the showdowns over fiscal policy will bleed over into the debate about America and Syria.

#### Nuclear war

Harris and Burrows ‘9

(Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>, AM)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

## 3

#### Interpretation—“economic engagement” means the aff must be an exclusively economic action

Jakstaite 10 - Doctoral Candidate Vytautas Magnus University Faculty of Political Sciences and Diplomacy (Lithuania) (Gerda, “CONTAINMENT AND ENGAGEMENT AS MIDDLE-RANGE THEORIES” BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 (2010), DOI: 10.2478/v10076-010-0015-7)

The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state‟s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations.94 Economic engagement is academically wielded in several respects. It recommends that the state engage the target country in the international community (with the there existing rules) and modify the target state‟s run foreign policy, thus preventing the emergence of a potential enemy.95 Thus, this strategy aims to ensure safety in particular, whereas economic benefit is not a priority objective. Objectives of economic engagement indicate that this form of engagement is designed for relations with problematic countries – those that pose a potential danger to national security of a state that implements economic engagement. Professor of the University of California Paul Papayoanou and University of Maryland professor Scott Kastner say that economic engagement should be used in relations with the emerging powers: countries which accumulate more and more power, and attempt a new division of power in the international system – i.e., pose a serious challenge for the status quo in the international system (the latter theorists have focused specifically on China-US relations). These theorists also claim that economic engagement is recommended in relations with emerging powers whose regimes are not democratic – that is, against such players in the international system with which it is difficult to agree on foreign policy by other means.96 Meanwhile, other supporters of economic engagement (for example, professor of the University of California Miles Kahler) are not as categorical and do not exclude the possibility to realize economic engagement in relations with democratic regimes.97 Proponents of economic engagement believe that the economy may be one factor which leads to closer relations and cooperation (a more peaceful foreign policy and the expected pledge to cooperate) between hostile countries – closer economic ties will develop the target state‟s dependence on economic engagement implementing state for which such relations will also be cost-effective (i.e., the mutual dependence). However, there are some important conditions for the economic factor in engagement to be effective and bring the desired results. P. Papayoanou and S. Kastner note that economic engagement gives the most positive results when initial economic relations with the target state is minimal and when the target state‟s political forces are interested in development of international economic relations. Whether economic relations will encourage the target state to develop more peaceful foreign policy and willingness to cooperate will depend on the extent to which the target state‟s forces with economic interests are influential in internal political structure. If the target country‟s dominant political coalition includes the leaders or groups interested in the development of international economic relations, economic ties between the development would bring the desired results. Academics note that in non-democratic countries in particular leaders often have an interest to pursue economic cooperation with the powerful economic partners because that would help them maintain a dominant position in their own country.98 Proponents of economic engagement do not provide a detailed description of the means of this form of engagement, but identify a number of possible variants of engagement: conditional economic engagement, using the restrictions caused by economic dependency and unconditional economic engagement by exploiting economic dependency caused by the flow. Conditional economic engagement, sometimes called linkage or economic carrots engagement, could be described as conflicting with economic sanctions. A state that implements this form of engagement instead of menacing to use sanctions for not changing policy course promises for a target state to provide more economic benefits in return for the desired political change. Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the target state‟s behaviour.99 Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of engagement. Engagement applying state while developing economic relations with an adversary hopes that the resulting economic dependence over time will change foreign policy course of the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Theorists assume that economic dependence may act as a restriction of target state‟s foreign policy or as transforming factor that changes target state‟s foreign policy objectives.100 Thus, economic engagement focuses solely on economic measures (although theorists do not give a more detailed description), on strategically important actors of the international arena and includes other types of engagement, such as the conditional-unconditional economic engagement.

#### Violation—the affirmative invests in ports—this is not the transportation infrastructure topic

#### Voting issue—

#### Limits—they explode the topic—blurring the lines between economic and other forms of engagement makes any interaction with another country topical—it’s impossible to predict or prepare

## 4

#### Text: The United States federal government ought to enter into prior, binding consultation with the government of Brazil on whether it ought to offer to increase trade with the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela if it complies with the standards of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Program code set by the International Maritime Organization with the possibility of minor modifications by the Brazilian government.

#### Prior binding consultation key to U.S.-Brazil relations

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A prerequisite for improved mutual engagement will be changes in perspective on both sides. Mutually beneficial engagement requires the United States to welcome Brazil’s emergence as a global power. Brazil is more than a tropical China35; it is culturally and politically close to the United States and Europe. Brazil, in turn, needs to realize that the United States accepts its rise. Brazil also needs to recognize that the United States still matters greatly to Brasilia and that more can be achieved work¬ing with Washington than against it.¶ The United States and Brazil have vast overlapping in-terests, but a formal strategic partnership is probably out of the question for both countries. In the United States, Brazil must compete for policy attention with China, India, Rus-sia, Japan, Mexico, and several European countries. It poses no security threat to the United States. Moreover, despite Brazil’s importance in multilateral organizations, particu¬larly the UN, Brazil can be of limited practical assistance at best to the United States in its two current wars. Brazil’s interests, in turn, may be fairly said to include the need to distinguish itself from the United States. Diplomatically, this means neither country can expect automatic agreement from the other. Interests differ and it may be politically nec¬essary to highlight differences even when interests are simi-lar. But both countries should make every effort to develop a habit of “permanent consultation” in an effort to coordinate policies, work pragmatically together where interests are common, and reduce surprises even while recognizing that specific interests and policies often may differ.¶ A first operational step, therefore, is for both coun-tries to hold regular policy-level consultations, increase exchanges of information, and coordinate carefully on multilateral matters. This is much easier said than done. The list of global issues on which Brazil is becoming a major player includes conflict resolution, all aspects of energy, including nuclear matters, all types of trade, the environment, space, and the development of internation¬al law, including law of the seas and nonproliferation. To share information and ensure effective consultation on so many functional issues will require finding ways to lessen the geographic stovepiping natural to bureaucracy. The U.S. Department of State, for example, has historically organized itself into geographical bureaus responsible for relations with countries in particular regions, leaving functional issues to offices organized globally. This orga¬nization hampers the exchange of information and con¬sultation with countries such as Brazil, whose reach and policies go beyond their particular geographic region. One result is that multilateral affairs are still often an isolated afterthought in the U.S. Government. Are there things the United States and Brazil could do, whether bi¬laterally or in the World Trade Organization, that would offset some of the negative effects of the China trade on manufacturing in both their countries?36 Just posing the question reveals the complexity of the task.

#### Relations solve global prolif

Trinkunas & Bruneau 12 (Harold & Thomas, Ph.D. at Naval Post Graduate School, Center on Contemporary conflict, “US Brazil Workshop on Global and Regional Security,” December 2012, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA574567&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>)

Brazilian participants also noted the particular alignment of domestic constituencies regarding issues such as MERCOSUR and UNASUR, which they saw as demonstrating that Brazil was a consolidated democracy that had to respond to domestic political and economic interests in much the same way that the United States government did. The United States and Brazil also look very similar in their relationship with the region, one participant said. If we actually look at the interests of United States and Brazil, they are very convergent. One Brazilian participant also added that, like the United States, Brazil is happy to retreat back to unilateralism. Brazilian participants repeatedly emphasized that Brazil is uniquely qualified to play the role of international peacemaker due to their peaceful traditions, the strength of their diplomacy, and their experience in reducing tensions during international crises. Brazilians also stressed that as a consolidated free market democracy, Brazil is inherently a responsible power in the international arena. They disagreed with the characterization of Brazil as a ‘spoiler’, a position held by some U.S. observers of global nonproliferation efforts (albeit not by the U.S. participants in this dialogue). Again and again Brazilian participants emphasized their responsible and mature behavior in important international issues, including nuclear ones. The dialogue participants from outside of the region agreed that Brazil has acquired a good reputation for its skilled diplomacy. One U.S. participant predicted that Brazil would eventually join the expanded UN Security Council as a permanent member. The Brazilians considered the U.S. and Brazil to be natural partners in international nonproliferation efforts, and both sides agreed that the international nonproliferation regime was in crisis. They offered different explanations, however, for the roots of the regime crisis. A participant from within the region added that it is difficult for Brazil and the U.S. to be on the same page or even debate nuclear issues because the two countries comes from very different ends of the nuclear spectrum. Participants observed that the NPT regime is in the midst of a legitimacy crisis. One participant said that from an institutional point of view, the original design of the regime left it unable to adapt to changes that have taken place in the international system since the Cold War. Some U.S. participants expressed optimism that the NPT has been bolstered by the Obama administration’s support for the NPT. A change in both attitude and policy from the administration has fostered a new sense of hope in the NPT’s utility. This participant added that only by fully engaging other members of the NPT can the U.S. and Brazil hope to make the non-proliferation regime stronger.

#### Extinction

Victor AUtgoff**,** Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Institute for Defense Analysis, Summer 2002, Survival,p.87.90

Further, the large number of states that became capable of building nuclear weapons over the years, but chose not to, can be reasonably well explained by the fact that most were formally allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Both these superpowers had strong nuclear forces and put great pressure on their allies not to build nuclear weapons. Since the Cold War, the US has retained all its allies. In addition, NATO has extended its protection to some of the previous allies of the Soviet Union and plans on taking in more. Nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan, and proliferation programmes by North Korea, Iran and Iraq, all involve states in the opposite situation: all judged that they faced serious military opposition and had little prospect of establishing a reliable supporting alliance with a suitably strong, nuclear-armed state. What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United States, were [was] no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclear-backed aggression? At least a few additional states would begin to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets, and these initiatives would spur increasing numbers of the world’s capable states to follow suit. Restraint would seem ever less necessary and ever more dangerous. Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Many, perhaps most, of the world’s states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a highly proliferated world would probably be very rapid. While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint. Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent’s nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other’s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

## 5

#### Oil balanced slightly above $100 now, but it’s tenuous – market shift causes price decrease

Sampson 9/26 (Pamela, AP Business Writer, “Oil Dips Below $103 as Diplomacy on Syria Advances”, ABC News, 9/26/13, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/oil-price-hangs-month-low-20379334>)

Oil prices fell Friday, a day after the U.N. Security Council made progress in the quest to get Syria to relinquish its chemical weapons.¶ Benchmark oil for November delivery fell 57 cents to $102.46 per barrel at late afternoon Bangkok time in electronic trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange.¶ The council's five permanent members on Thursday agreed to a resolution calling for Syria to get rid of its chemical weapons. That helped ease fears of an escalation in Syria's civil war since the U.S. has been threatening to attack Syria in retaliation for what Washington says was a chemical gas attack by forces loyal to President Bashar Assad against civilians in suburban Damascus.¶ The prospect of an attack, and the potential for a disruption in oil supply routes, caused oil prices to spike in recent weeks. Prices have gradually fallen in recent days as diplomacy over Syria advanced. The progress at the U.N. on Thursday maintained the downward trend on the price of oil, said Ken Hasegawa, energy analyst at Newedge Brokerage in Tokyo.¶ Upbeat news about the U.S. economy pushed prices higher Thursday. The contract for benchmark crude gained 37 cents Thursday to close at $103.03 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange. Oil had dropped $5.41, or 5 percent, over the five previous trading sessions.¶ Oil prices rose as data showed that the number of Americans seeking unemployment benefits fell 5,000 last week to a seasonally adjusted 305,000, the second-lowest level in six years. The U.S. economy, meanwhile, was confirmed to have grown an annualized 2.5 percent in the April-June period.¶ Brent crude, the benchmark for international crudes used by many U.S. refineries, fell 33 cents to $108.88 a barrel on the ICE Futures exchange in London.

#### Engagement with Venezuela lowers prices

White and Rowley 13, Garry, mining correspondent for Telegraph, Emma, a reporter on the Telegraph business desk, covering mining, commodities, and construction “Death of Hugo Chavez propels Venezuelan oil production into the spotlight,” March 11th, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/commodities/9920725/Death-of-Hugo-Chavez-propels-Venezuelan-oil-production-into-the-spotlight.html

Venezuela has the largest known oil reserves in the world, but oil output has slumped by almost a third because of Mr Chavez’s nationalisation of the industry. At the end of 2011, the country held 17.9pc of the world’s known oil reserves, compared with 16.1pc in Saudi Arabia and 11pc in Canada, according to BP’s statistical review of world energy. However, it only represented 3.5pc of global production compared with 13.2pc in Saudi Arabia. It is likely that oil output could rise, should there be an easing of the country’s antagonism to foreign investors. Some believe this could lead to a fall in the oil price and a consequent boost to the global economy. “The death of Hugo Chavez may see oil prices fall as they did during the 2002 coup,” Gerard Lane, an oil analyst at Shore Capital, said. “With greater foreign investment it is foreseeable that the 30pc fall in Venezuelan oil production could be reversed. Indeed **the scale of potential oil output is enough** combined with on-going shale oil production growth in the USA, suggesting that oil prices could fall.” However, such a scenario is unlikely just yet. “Venezuela’s massive oil reserves will not be unleashed on global oil markets anytime soon, while the near-term impact on prices will be limited,” Ole Hansen, head of commodity strategy at Saxo Bank, noted. “The state oil company PDVSA has increasingly been handing over its income to fund various government programmes, leaving it with negative cash flows for the past five years,” Mr Hansen added. “The result of this has been a lack of investments as old fields matured and new ones were not explored, hence the drop in output.” Mr Hansen believes reforms and the re-introduction of foreign investment will not happen overnight, possibly not for a few years.

#### Russia is on the brink—$100 key to prevent complete collapse

**Whitmore 13** (Brian, Senior Correspondent in RFE/RL's Central Newsroom, covering ... security, energy and military issues and domestic developments in Russia, “After The Storm: Trends To Watch In Russia In 2013”, January 02, 2013, The Power Vertical)

It began with a roar and it ended with a whimper. As 2012 wound down in Russia, the soaring expectations for change that accompanied the civic awakening and mass protests at the year’s dawn had clearly faded. But the social, economic, and political forces that spawned them will continue to shape the landscape well into the new year. A fledgling middle class remains hungry for political change, splits still plague the ruling elite over the way forward, and a fractious opposition movement continues to struggle to find its voice. With the Kremlin unable to decisively squelch the mounting dissent and the opposition unable to topple President Vladimir Putin, Russia has entered an uneasy holding pattern that has the feel of an interlude between two epochs. "I don't think we are at the end of the Putin era, but we are at the beginning of the end," says longtime Russia-watcher Edward Lucas, international editor of the British weekly "The Economist" and author of the recently published book "Deception." With economic headwinds on the horizon, generational conflict brewing, and new political forces developing, Russian society is changing -- and changing rapidly. But the political system remains ossified. So what can we expect in 2013? Below are several trends and issues to keep an eye on in the coming year. The Oil Curse: Energy Prices And The Creaking Welfare State If 2012 was all about politics, 2013 will also be about economics. The Russian economy, the cliche goes, rests on two pillars -- oil and gas. And both will come under increasing pressure as the year unfolds. World oil prices, currently hovering between $90 and $100 per barrel, are expected to be volatile for the foreseeable future. And any sharp drop could prove catastrophic for the Russian economy. Energy experts and economists say Russia's budget will only stay balanced if oil prices remain between $100 and $110 per barrel. Five years ago, the figure needed for a balanced budget was $50 to $55.

#### Extinction

**Oliker 2** (Olga and Tanya Charlick-Paley, RAND Corporation Project Air Force, Assessing Russia’s Decline – Trends and Implications for the United States and the U.S. Air Force, RAND)

The preceding chapters have illustrated the ways in which Russia’s decline affects that country and may evolve into challenges and dangers that extend well beyond its borders. The political factors of de- cline may make Russia a less stable international actor and other factors may increase the risk of internal unrest. Together and sepa- rately, they increase the risk of conflict and the potential scope of other imaginable disasters. The trends of regionalization, particu- larly the disparate rates of economic growth among regions com- bined with the politicization of regional economic and military inter- ests, will be important to watch. The potential for locale, or possibly ethnicity, to serve as a rallying point for internal conflict is low at pre- sent, but these factors have the potential to feed into precisely the cycle of instability that political scientists have identified as making states in transition to democracy more likely to become involved in war. These factors also increase the potential for domestic turmoil, which further increases the risk of international conflict, for instance if Moscow seeks to unite a divided nation and/or demonstrate globally that its waning power remains something to be reckoned with. Given Russia’s conventional weakness, an increased risk of conflict carries with it an increased risk of nuclear weapons use, and Russia’s demographic situation increases the potential for a major epidemic with possible implications for Europe and perhaps beyond. The dangers posed by Russia’s civilian and military nuclear weapons complex, aside from the threat of nuclear weapons use, create a real risk of proliferation of weapons or weapons materials to terrorist groups, as well as perpetuating an increasing risk of accident at one of Russia’s nuclear power plants or other facilities. These elements touch upon key security interests, thus raising serious concerns for the United States. A declining Russia increases the likelihood of conflict—internal or otherwise—and the general de- terioration that Russia has in common with “failing” states raises se- rious questions about its capacity to respond to an emerging crisis. A crisis in large, populous, and nuclear-armed Russia can easily affect the interests of the United States and its allies. In response to such a scenario, the United States, whether alone or as part of a larger coalition, could be asked to send military forces to the area in and around Russia. This chapter will explore a handful of scenarios that could call for U.S. involvement. A wide range of crisis scenarios can be reasonably extrapolated from the trends implicit in Russia’s decline. A notional list includes: • Authorized or unauthorized belligerent actions by Russian troops in trouble-prone Russian regions or in neighboring states could lead to armed conflict. • Border clashes with China in the **Russian Far East** or between Russia and Ukraine, the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, or another neighbor could escalate into interstate combat. • Nuclear-armed terrorists based in Russia or using weapons or materials diverted from Russian facilities could threaten Russia, Europe, Asia, or the United States. • Civil war in Russia could involve fighting near storage sites for nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and agents, risking large-scale contamination and humanitarian disaster. • A nuclear accident at a power plant or facility could endanger life and health in Russia and neighboring states. • A chemical accident at a plant or nuclear-related facility could endanger life and health in Russia and neighboring states. • Ethnic pogroms in south Russia could force refugees into Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and/or Ukraine. Illustrative Scenarios • Economic and ethnic conflicts in Caucasus could erupt into armed clashes, which would endanger oil and gas pipelines in the region. • A massive ecological disaster such as an earthquake, famine, or epidemic could spawn refugees and spread illness and death across borders. • An increasingly criminalized Russian economy could create a safe haven for crime or even terrorist-linked groups. From this base, criminals, drug traders, and terrorists could threaten the people and economies of Europe, Asia, and the United States. • Accelerated Russian weapons and technology sales or unautho- rized diversion could foster the **proliferation** of weapons and weapon materials to rogue states and nonstate terrorist actors, increasing the risk of nuclear war. This list is far from exhaustive. However significant these scenarios may be, not all are relevant to U.S. military planning. We therefore applied several criteria to the larger portfolio of potential scenarios, with an eye to identifying the most useful for a more detailed discus- sion. First, only those scenarios that involve a reasonable threat to U.S. strategic interests were considered. Second, while it is impor- tant to plan for the unexpected, it is equally crucial to understand the likelihood of various events. We thus included a range of probabili- ties but eliminated those that we considered least plausible. Third, we only chose scenarios for which the Western response would likely be military or would rely on considerable military involvement. Lastly, we wanted to select a variety of situations, ones that created differing imperatives for the U.S. government and its Air Force, rather than scenarios, which, while equal in significance, present fairly similar problems. We therefore offer the following four story- lines as illustrative, if far from exhaustive, of the types of challenges that would be presented by operations on or near Russian territory.

## Terrorism

#### No Latin American terrorism

Richard Weitz 11, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute. “Where are Latin America’s Terrorists?” 11-9-11http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/where-are-latin-america-s-terrorists-

 The Colombian army’s killing of Alfonso Cano, head of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), will not eliminate that country’s largest guerrilla group anytime soon. But it does partly illustrate why international terrorism has not established a major presence in Latin America. Local security forces, bolstered by generous American assistance, have made the region a difficult place for foreign terrorists to set up operational cells – and other conditions also help to make Latin America less vulnerable. One reason why the FARC has survived repeated blows to its leadership is the support that it receives from various groups, perhaps including government officials, in neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela. Fortunately, this backing appears to have declined in the last year or so, following improvement in Colombia’s relations with these countries. Another factor contributing to the FARC’s survival has been its transformation over the years from a revolutionary organization into a narco-terrorist group that uses violence to support its criminal operations. Many former terrorist and insurgent groups in the region have undergone similar transformations over the last two decades. These groups, some with transnational reach, mostly engage in narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, and kidnapping. At worst, they sometimes employ terrorist tactics (commonly defined as violence that deliberately targets civilians). In Colombia, the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) finance their operations through drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. These groups might kill civilians, but their main targets are the police and security personnel who threaten their activities. Latin America is distinctive in the recurring and broad overlap of mass movements professing revolutionary goals with transnational criminal operations. The Internet and modern social media are allowing these mass criminal movements to expand their activities beyond kidnapping, extortion, and trafficking in drugs, arms, and people, to include fraud, piracy, information theft, hacking, and sabotage. Violent mass movements remain in some Latin American countries, but, like the FARC, they are typically heavily engaged in organized crime. Drug cartels and gang warfare may ruin the lives of thousands of innocent people, but they should not be seen as equivalent to the ideological revolutionaries who used to wreak havoc in the region, or to contemporary mass terrorists. Extra-regional terrorist movements such as al-Qaeda have minimal presence in South America, with little independent operational activity and few ties to local violent movements. At most, the two types of groups might share operational insights and revenue from transnational criminal operations. Hezbollah has not conducted an attack in Latin America in almost two decades. Indigenous organized criminal movements are responsible for the most serious sources of local violence. Latin American countries generally are not a conducive environment for major terrorist groups. They lack large Muslim communities that could provide a bridgehead for Islamist extremist movements based in Africa and the Middle East. The demise of military dictatorships and the spread of democratic regimes throughout Latin America (except for Cuba) means that even severe economic, class, ethnic, and other tensions now more often manifest themselves politically, in struggles for votes and influence. No Latin American government appears to remain an active state sponsor of foreign terrorist movements. At worst, certain public officials may tolerate some foreign terrorists’ activities and neglect to act vigorously against them. More often, governments misapply anti-terrorist laws against their non-violent opponents. For example, despite significant improvement in its human-rights policies, the Chilean government has at times applied harsh anti-terrorism laws against indigenous Mapuche protesters. Indeed, Latin American terrorism is sometimes exaggerated, because governments have incentives to cite local terrorist threats to secure foreign support, such as US capacity-building funding. Just as during the Cold War, when Latin American leaders were lavished with aid for fighting communist subversion, governments seek to fight “terrorist” threats at America’s expense. Ironically, the strength of transnational criminal organizations in Latin America may act as a barrier to external terrorist groups. Extra-regional terrorists certainly have incentives to penetrate the region. Entering the US, a high-value target for some violent extremist groups, from Latin America is not difficult for skilled operatives. Extra-regional terrorist groups could also raise funds and collaborate operationally with local militants. But Latin America’s powerful transnational criminal movements, such as the gangs in Mexico that control much of the drug trafficking into the US, do not want to jeopardize their profits by associating themselves with al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Supporting terrorism would merely divert time and other resources from profit-making activities, while focusing unsought US and other international attention on their criminal operations.

#### The plan won’t change Maduro’s tone — engagement entrenches the regime

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On the margins of a multilateral summit in Guatemala last week, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jose Jaua, marking the Obama administration's latest attempt to reset relations with the South American nation. What's worrisome is that Secretary Kerry's enthusiasm to find, in his words, a "new way forward" with Venezuela could end up legitimizing Chavez-successor Nicolas Maduro's quest for power and undermining the country's democratic opposition and state institutions. Since the death of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez in March, Maduro's actions have more resembled those of a Cuban strongman than a democratically-elected official. Indeed, he has taken drastic moves to preserve his power and discredit his critics in recent months. First, the Maduro regime is refusing to allow a full audit of the fraudulent April 13th presidential elections, as opposition presidential candidate Henrique Capriles had requested. As the Associated Press notes a full audit "would have included not just comparing votes electronically registered by machines with the paper ballot receipts they emitted, but also comparing those with the poll station registries that contain voter signatures and with digitally recorded fingerprints." However, because Chavez-era appointees loyal to the current government dominate Venezuela's National Election Council and Supreme Court – the two government institutions able to challenge election results – it is unlikely either will accept the opposition's demands for a full election recount. Second, Maduro's government is taking steps to dominate radio and television coverage of the regime. Last month, Globovision, one of Venezuela's last remaining independent news channels, was sold to a group of investors with close ties to Maduro. Under Chavez, the independent broadcasting station faced years of pressure as government authorities frequently threatened to arrest the group's owners and journalists. To no one's surprise, the company's new ownership has banned live video coverage of opposition leader Henrique Capriles and many of the station's prominent journalists have been fired or have resigned. Third, the regime and its allies are using fear and intimidation to silence the opposition. On April 30th, pro-Maduro lawmakers physically attacked opposition legislators on the floor of Venezuela's National Assembly. Days prior, the regime arrested a former military general who was critical of Cuba's growing influence on Venezuela's armed forces. More recently, Maduro even called for the creation of "Bolivarian Militias of Workers" to "defend the sovereignty of the homeland." In light of all this, it remains unclear why the Obama administration seeks, in Secretary Kerry's words, "an ongoing, continuing dialogue at a high level between the State Department and the [Venezuelan] Foreign Ministry" – let alone believe that such engagement will lead to any substantive change in Maduro's behavior. To be sure, Caracas's recent release of jailed American filmmaker Timothy Tracy is welcome and long overdue. However, it is clear that the bogus charges of espionage against Tracy were used as leverage in talks with the United States, a shameful move reminiscent of Fidel Castro's playbook. While Secretary Kerry said that his meeting with his Venezuelan counterpart included discussion of human rights and democracy issues, the Obama administration's overall track record in the region gives reason for concern. President Obama failed to mention Venezuela or Chavez's abuse of power during his weeklong trip to the region in 2011. And while Obama refused at first to acknowledge the April election results, the State Department has since sent very different signals. Indeed, Secretary Kerry declined even to mention Venezuela directly during his near 30-minute address to the plenary session of the Organization of American States in Guatemala last week. For Venezuela's opposition, the Obama administration's eagerness to revive relations with Maduro is a punch to the gut. Pro-Maduro legislators in the National Assembly have banned opposition lawmakers from committee hearings and speaking on the assembly floor. Other outspoken critics of the regime face criminal charges, and government officials repeatedly vilify and slander Capriles. What's worse, if the United States grants or is perceived to grant legitimacy to the Maduro government, that could give further cover to the regime as it systematically undermines Venezuela's remaining institutions. The Obama administration's overtures to Maduro's government come as the region is increasingly skeptical of the Chavez successor's reign. Last month, Capriles met with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos in Bogota. Chile's Senate unanimously passed a resolution urging a total audit of all polling stations. And in recent weeks, opposition lawmakers led by María Corina Machado, a representative from the National Assembly of Venezuela, have held meetings in capitals around the region to educate foreign leaders about Maduro's illegitimate hold on power. Rather than accept Maduro's strongman tactics, the Obama administration should take a firm stand and make clear to Caracas that any steps to undermine the country's constitution or threaten the opposition will be detrimental to bilateral ties with the United States. The fact is that Washington holds all the cards. Venezuela's economy is in a free-fall, Maduro's popularity is plummeting, and various public scandals – especially those related to institutional corruption – could further erode public confidence in the current government. By resetting relations with the Maduro government now, the United States risks legitimizing the Chavez protégé's ill-gotten hold on power and undercutting the Venezuelan democratic opposition efforts to sustain and expand its popular support. It's time the Obama administration rethink this hasty reset with Maduro.

#### Iran is not working with Venezuela – there’s no chance of terrorism, prolif, or an alliance against the US – Noriega is wrong

Mallett-Outtrim ‘13

Ryan Mallett-Outtrim; writer for Merida News Organization; Venezuelanalysis.com, “Venezuela-Iran Relations: No Longer Imperilled by Imperialism?” – June 30th 2013

Two events that defy hawk logic have taken place in the same month. First, on the 5th of June United States secretary of state John Kerry met with Venezuela's foreign minister, Elias Jaua, and stated that he had agreed to pursue a more “positive relationship” with Venezuela. Then, just weeks later, Iranians voted in a president who has openly argued against nuclear proliferation.¶ What happened? Iran and Venezuela's amiable relationship of the last decade was supposed to be the sum of all fears for Washington. Two “tyrants”, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hugo Chavez, were accused of co-sponsoring all sorts of wild, fantastical plots by Washington's warmongers. But was the Iran-Venezuela relationship ever about crushing the “free world” by assembling an unholy alliance of druglords, Islamists and socialists, or is there a slightly saner explanation?¶ The crazy brigade¶ It was just in March that Roger Noriega delivered his red blooded testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that alleged that Latin American drug traffickers, Hezbollah, Venezuela and Iran have all united in some kind of convoluted plot that involves waging “asymmetrical warfare against U.S. security, interests and allies close to the homeland”. Along with stating that “Hezbollah operatives and their radical anti-Semitic allies hold important senior positions in the Venezuelan government”, Noriega also argued that Margarita Island is basically one big Hezbollah training camp (could put a slight dent in the government's ambitions to develop the tourism sector) and that senior “chavista officials engage routinely in lucrative schemes involving Hezbollah front companies, Colombian terrorist groups, narcotraffickers, Venezuelan financial institutions and even powerful state-run entities”.¶ In short a unified front of Arabs, Iranians, terrorism, drugs and state run enterprises united against Washington. Noriega is far from a lone voice warning against this rainbow of conservative fears. Vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council Ilan Berman has also warned that a myriad of recent events ranging from toilet paper shortages in Venezuela to the Colombian peace process are all possibly playing into the hands of a shadowy “network enabling Iran to carry out attacks in the region”. Last year, an opinion piece in the Miami Herald penetrated to the core of this existential threat to the U.S.: the “most remarkable and dangerous foreign policy initiative of the [former] Chávez regime”, its positive relationship with Iran. The article continues by arguing that the threat of Iran and Venezuela cooperating to “smuggle a nuclear weapon into the U.S...should not be dismissed lightly”.¶ The relationship between Caracas and Iran was a key consideration when lawmakers passed the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 (CIWHA), which aims to “address Iran's growing hostile presence and activity” in the region. Since CIWHA was passed, Venezuela's state arms manufacturer has been targeted by U.S. sanctions under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA).¶ Perhaps the events of June will make some of the fear brigade rethink the Iran-Venezuela relationship. After all, the relationship between the two countries isn't quite as sinister as the likes of Noriega make it out to be. No, Iran and Venezuela are not cooperating to nuke Miami, and PDVSA might not actually be a Hezbollah front. The reality of the relationship is just as interesting, but it just doesn't read like an Ian Fleming novel.

#### No risk of nuclear terror

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, <http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html>)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

#### Venezuela collapse inevitable – multiple causes

Nagel 2013(Juan, Venezuela blogger for Transitions, May 16, " Is Venezuela becoming a failed state?", http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/16/is\_venezuela\_becoming\_a\_failed\_state)

Venezuela remains mired in a political and economic crisis that shows no signs of letting up. But while street protests, soaring inflation, scarcity, and skyrocketing crime are massive headaches, the government can count on still-high oil prices to soothe the pain a bit. The question that begs asking is: How will Venezuela maintain stability if oil prices drop? A [recent report](http://www.ibtimes.com/iea-says-supply-shock-north-american-shale-tar-sands-transforming-global-energy-scene-1257095) by the International Energy Agency underscores the challenges the country faces in the short term. The United States has made huge progress in oil extraction thanks to fracking technology. It is set to become the world's largest oil producer by the year 2020, and the global spread of fracking is bound to significantly increase international recoverable oil reserves in the near future. The agency crows that fracking is creating a "supply shock that is sending ripples around the world." This obviously matters to Venezuela, a country that exports large amounts of oil and little else. Venezuela is increasingly reliant on high oil prices to maintain some semblance of stability. A prolonged drop in oil prices will undoubtedly shake the foundations of the petro-state to its core. Being an oil producer, Venezuela can earn money in two ways: by sustaining high prices, or by increasing production. (Obviously, if it can do both things, it has hit the jackpot). Fracking threatens the first, and the country has seriously failed on the latter. Venezuela produces less oil now than it did in 1999, the year Hugo Chávez first came to power. Worryingly, the IEA sees [few prospects](http://www2.petroguia.com.ve/pub/?q=node/1803) for increased production. For example, in spite of [increasing](http://settysoutham.wordpress.com/2012/04/17/pdvsa-investment-surged-in-2011-missed-goal-and-other-annual-report-stuff/) investment to $22 billion last year, Venezuelan production barely budged. State oil giant PDVSA vows to increase production by 3 million barrels per day in the next six years, but the IEA believes that a combination of the company's inefficiency and its heavy debt burden means the increase will actually be a tenth of that amount. Two other developments conspire against the future viability of Venezuela's oil industry. The country is increasing sales of [crude oil to China](http://lta.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idLTASIE94E05T20130515?sp=true), as part of a geo-strategic move the Chávez administration embarked on many years ago. The problem is that the oil being shipped [has already been paid for](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/26/us-venezuela-chavez-fund-idUSBRE88P0N020120926), and the government has also already spent the money. The other issue is Venezuela's creaking refining infrastructure. Last year, following [several accidents](http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/08/pictures/120830-venezuela-refinery-fire-pictures/) at its refineries, Venezuela became a [net importer](http://lta.reuters.com/article/topNews/idLTASIE94D01X20130514) of gasoline and other refined products. In the last part of the year alone, PDVSA bought refined products for $1.5 billion, only to turn around and give it away for practically nothing, thanks to the heavy subsidies that characterize its internal market. The consensus is that Venezuela [needs high oil prices](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444320704577565020463797512.html) just to stay afloat. But if the fracking oil boom results in low oil prices, what does the future hold for the South American country? Sadly, Venezuelans have nothing else to fall back on. Its private industry is a shambles, and the country is even [importing toilet paper](http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/16/venezuela_is_running_low_on_toilet_paper_and_it_s_blaming_the_media). Years of populism have left the state crippled and heavily in debt. The public deficit [reached](http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/121025/research-firm-estimates-venezuelas-fiscal-deficit-at-15-of-gdp) a whopping 15 percent of GDP last year, even in the context of high oil prices. Most of the spending came in the form of entitlements and subsidies that will not be easily eliminated. Furthermore, the country's current power clique seems [particularly inept](http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-05-15/venezuela-may-allow-companies-to-repatriate-some-dividends) in dealing with the complicated economic and political conditions it has inherited. Nicolás Maduro's only claim to legitimacy is that Hugo Chávez chose him. Now he is left with the thankless task of dealing with the [Chávez mess](http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/editorials/hugo-chavez-leaves-a-mess-behind/article9317467/). He has surrounded himself with a Cabinet composed of many of the same old faces, and neither his policies nor his rhetoric suggest any shift toward the type of solutions that could steer Venezuela away from the precipice. The problem for Venezuelans is that there is no great reformer in the governing party. And while opposition leader Henrique Capriles would undoubtedly steer Venezuela toward greater economic freedoms, there is little he would be able to do if the price of oil were to tank. A long period of low oil prices spells doom for Venezuela's political sustainability. Without high oil revenues, basic services would practically disappear, and the potential for instability would be enormous. Already the country is stuck in a state of undeclared in civil war, and there are claims that drug smuggling has [permeated](http://www.insightcrime.org/groups-venezuela/cartel-de-los-soles) the higher echelons of the government.

## Legitimacy

#### Data disproves hegemony impacts

Fettweis, 11

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.

The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated.

Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered.

However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation.

It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### No disease impact

Malcolm **Gladwell**, writer for The New Yorker and best-selling author The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 19**95**, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 31-32

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.

#### Petras evidence is in the context of Columbian bases – not a relevant consideration

#### No impact to warming – consensus

Taylor 12 (James, Forbes energy and environment writer, 3/14/2012, "Shock Poll: Meteorologists Are Global Warming Skeptics", www.forbes.com/sites/jamestaylor/2012/03/14/shock-poll-meteorologists-are-global-warming-skeptics/)

A recent survey of American Meteorological Society members shows meteorologists are skeptical that humans are causing a global warming crisis. The survey confirms what many scientists have been reporting for years; the politically focused bureaucratic leadership of many science organizations is severely out of touch with the scientists themselves regarding global warming issues. According to American Meteorological Society (AMS) data, 89% of AMS meteorologists believe global warming is happening, but only a minority (30%) is very worried about global warming. This sharp contrast between the large majority of meteorologists who believe global warming is happening and the modest minority who are nevertheless very worried about it is consistent with other scientist surveys. This contrast exposes global warming alarmists who assert that 97% of the world’s scientists agree humans are causing a global warming crisis simply because these scientists believe global warming is occurring. However, as this and other scientist surveys show, believing that some warming is occurring is not the same as believing humans are causing a worrisome crisis. Other questions solidified the meteorologists’ skepticism about humans creating a global warming crisis. For example, among those meteorologists who believe global warming is happening, only a modest majority (59%) believe humans are the primary cause. More importantly, only 38% of respondents who believe global warming is occurring say it will be very harmful during the next 100 years. With substantially fewer than half of meteorologists very worried about global warming or expecting substantial harm during the next 100 years, one has to wonder why environmental activist groups are sowing the seeds of global warming panic. Does anyone really expect our economy to be powered 100 years from now by the same energy sources we use today? Why immediately, severely, and permanently punish our economy with costly global warming restrictions when technological advances and the free market will likely address any such global warming concerns much more efficiently, economically and effectively? In another line of survey questions, 53% of respondents believe there is conflict among AMS members regarding the topic of global warming. Only 33% believe there is no conflict. Another 15% were not sure. These results provide strong refutation to the assertion that “the debate is over.” Interestingly, only 26% of respondents said the conflict among AMS members is unproductive. Overall, the survey of AMS scientists paints a very different picture than the official AMS Information Statement on Climate Change. Drafted by the AMS bureaucracy, the Information Statement leaves readers with the impression that AMS meteorologists have few doubts about humans creating a global warming crisis. The Information Statement indicates quite strongly that humans are the primary driver of global temperatures and the consequences are and will continue to be quite severe. Compare the bureaucracy’s Information Statement with the survey results of the AMS scientists themselves. Scientists who have attended the Heartland Institute’s annual International Conference on Climate Change report the same disconnect throughout their various science organizations; only a minority of scientists believes humans are causing a global warming crisis, yet the non-scientist bureaucracies publish position statements that contradict what the scientists themselves believe. Few, if any, of these organizations actually poll their members before publishing a position statement. Within this context of few actual scientist surveys, the AMS survey results are very powerful.

#### Heg doesn’t solve war

Mastanduno, 9 – Professor of Government at Dartmouth

(Michael, World Politics 61, No. 1, Ebsco)

During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. The United States, notwithstanding its preponderant power, no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed, and the very success of the U.S.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic, military, and other capabilities.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. U.S. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms, after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed. The United States may continue to act its own way, but it can no longer count on getting its own way.

# 2nc

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## 2nc overview

#### Brazil is the lynchpin of successful US policy in Latin America—only the counterplan can solve the aff—no solvency absent Brazil

Hirst (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004 [Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.60-61)

According to Brazilian diplomats, relations with the United States have finally achieved “political maturity.” Bilateral political communications have become straightforward, and they avoid problematic areas such as trade disputes, which contaminate the relationship as a whole. There is also a strong perception among Brazilian officials that political commonalties have expanded ever since Brazilian democracy consolidated.¶ U.S. government perceptions are that Brazil, like the rest of South American countries, has made major changes that should contribute to strengthening the relationship on both sides. As stated by a U.S. government official in 1997, “The U.S. relationship with South America goes far beyond trade and economics, of course. Our policy in the region aims to keep the United States economically strong and internationally competitive, to promote the principles of democracy, and to increase the level of regional cooperation to more easily deal with transnational threats of narcotrafficking, environmental degradation, and international crime.” 61 Yet in the United States there is a frequent perception among the public concerned with hemispheric affairs that “Brazil has a way to go before necessary reforms are deepened and institutionalized to the point that they provide a really firm, substantially irreversible guarantee of positive performance in the future.” 62¶ An evaluation of the relations with Brazil was prepared by a group of experts from the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations for the current Bush administration in February 2001 in which Brazil was considered “the fulcrum of any successful U.S. policy initiative in South America.” 63 Relations with Brazil were perceived as essential to influencing the economic and political future of the hemisphere. This task force also acknowledged that to deepen understanding between the two countries it would be necessary to review U.S. policy toward Brazil so as to “work together on vital matters such as trade, drugs, and regional security and move thereafter to engage in a high-level sustained and cooperative strategic dialogue with Brazilian leaders.” 64¶ Among its most relevant suggestions, the report stresses the importance of understanding mutual differences and it urges the United States to discard a policy of benign neglect toward Brazil. The importance of relations with Brazil was grounded in four criteria: “economic power; its central location within South America; its status as a trading partner and the recipient of U.S. investment; and its diplomatic role within South America and the international agencies.” 65 The study also warned both the United States and Brazil about the risk of missing the moment to build up a positive agenda. Though trade negotiations with the United States could be replaced by negotiations with the European Union, Brazil could not afford to lose preferential access to the American market. As well, both countries are perceived to play complementary roles in the promotion of economic reform and democratic stabilility in South America.

#### Brazil would say yes to Venezuela

Radia 09 [Kirit, Masters in International Relations from Tufts University, member of ABC News' Emmy Award-winning team, 3/13/9, ABC news, “Treading Carefully, U.S. Hints It Wants to Engage Cuba, Venezuela”, <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/03/treading-carefu/>]

It’s a debate as old as the Monroe Doctrine: how should the United States engage its neighbors in the Western hemisphere? More often than not, the answer has been with a heavy hand. The Obama administration appears ready to buck the trend, hinting today it is looking to improve relations with countries like Cuba and Venezuela. During the campaign, Obama repeatedly said he would roll back Bush-era restrictions on family remittances and travel to Cuba. The Brazilian president is expected to urge President Obama to re-engage with Cuba and Venezuela when the two leaders meet at the White House tomorrow. "We are intent on engaging all countries constructively," Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon told reporters today when asked about the prospects of deeper engagement with countries in the region at odds with the United States. This will all be on display when President Obama attends the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago in April. "We will be going to the summit with an open and constructive attitude," Shannon said, though he noted it’s not only up to Washington. "Ultimately, our willingness to engage constructively with countries around the region depends on a reciprocal willingness on their part to engage with us," he said.

## 2nc at do both

## 2nc at: perm—do both

#### Honesty key to relations

"The Reluctant Partner" by Peter Hakim, Jan/Feb 2004 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59537/peter-hakim/the-reluctant-partner

The Bush administration should continue its good start, bolstering friendly U.S.-Brazil relations. Lula's administration welcomed the White House's two invitations and U.S. recognition of Brazil's special role in South America. Washington must remain attentive to Brasilia's interests. It would be good policy to systematically solicit Brazil's views on the full range of issues relevant to the hemisphere and take serious account of them. That will require Washington to pursue a less unilateral approach, particularly in South America, and be willing to accept compromises on its policies and programs. No U.S. administration yet has been able to do this on a sustained basis, and it may be particularly difficult for the Bush White House

ANYTHING SHORT OF BINDING CONSULTATION SNOWBALLS BRAZIL’S PREVIOUS FRUSTRATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES – FRACTURES RELATIONS

## 2nc at: slow

#### 1. Prolif is fast – tech dissemination

Mazarr 2002

Michael J Mazarr, Adjunct professor in security studies at Georgetown and former Professor of National Security Strategy at the U.S. National War College, 2002, “Nuclear Weapons in a Transformed World: The Challenge of Virtual Nuclear Arsenals”, P. 272-3

A second feature of the future world system seems likely to be its **inherent instability in the form of a potential for wildfire-like proliferation**. To date, proliferation has appeared as a process of piecemeal accumulation of weapons capacities, weaponry, and weapons states, subject possibly to delay, derailment, and sometimes reversal. But, as more states have the means at their disposal to build high-leverage strategic weapons based on what is available to them in the civilian economy, proliferation becomes a process that might unfold with great speed, as some group of states, whether within a region or across the international system, move suddenly to create hedges against an uncertain future. Those hedges might include new military research and development programs spun off from civilian NBC activities, more lavish funding for such programs and a push for greater sophistication and weaponization readiness, the construction of “bombs in the basement,” the assembly of the full accoutrement of effective military systems, or actual deployment, whether secret or open. The gaps between different states, would, of course, create advantages for those farthest along in the process of competitive hedging, **and the perception of those gaps could be a significant source of instability**. If it were to occur, wildfire-like proliferation would likely be visible and unsettling internationally. But it might also be nearly invisible, and thus doubly pernicious, by suggesting the existence of a stable world moving toward deeper cooperation when in fact **world order is weakening and the risk of war is growing**.

## \*\*\*T

## 2nc at: reasonability

#### Reasonability is impossible—it’s arbitrary and undermines research and preparation

Resnick, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, ‘1 (Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

## \*\*\*Terrorism

## 2nc no terrorism

#### Terrorism is impossible in Latin America – it’s not in their best interest and it’s a politically difficult region to shore up support – that’s Weitz

#### The status quo is no longer threatening — sponsoring terrorism was a Chávez-led doctrine — that dies out with Maduro

Ghitis 13 — independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor (Frida Ghitis, *World Politics Review*, 01-10-13, “World Citizen: Will Venezuela-Iran Links Survive Chávez?”, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12615/world-citizen-will-venezuela-iran-links-survive-chavez>, Accessed 06-30-2013)

During almost 14 years in office, Chávez made anti-Americanism the cornerstone of his foreign policy, working at every step to antagonize U.S. goals and undermine Washington’s influence. Perhaps the greatest irritant of all was the close relationship he forged with Iran, a country the U.S. and its allies believe is trying to develop nuclear weapons and sponsoring international terrorism. As the U.S. spearheaded efforts to pass United Nations sanctions to stop Iran’s nuclear enrichment, Chávez traveled to Tehran and, along with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, provocatively announced the creation of what they called an “Axis of Unity” against the U.S. The two countries work together in a number of areas. Of particular interest to the U.S. is Venezuela’s help to Iran in circumventing international sanctions. The question for Washington now is how to maximize the chances that once Chávez leaves the scene, the ties linking Caracas and Tehran, more than 7,000 miles away, will fade. Just before the end of the year, President Barack Obama signed into law the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act, which instructs the State Department to develop a strategy to “address Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity” in Latin America, and directs the Department of Homeland Security to take measures to protect U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada to keep out “operatives from Iran . . . Hezbollah or any other terrorist organizations.” For Iran and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah, Chávez’s worsening condition could not come at a worse time. Their closest and most crucial ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, is engulfed in a brutal civil war, likely to put an end to his regime and possibly destroy Syria’s ties with Iran and Hezbollah. The headwinds they face in Latin America recently came up in a speech by none other than Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Speaking a couple of days after the start of the year, Nasrallah said 2013 would bring a “very dangerous phase” for his organization, citing efforts to add the group to the European Union’s terrorist list and to restrict its movements in Latin America as specific challenges. Before traveling to Cuba for his most recent cancer surgery, Chávez dramatically acknowledged he may not be able to remain in power and anointed Vice President Nicolas Maduro as his chosen successor. Washington has already taken tentative steps, seeking to reach out to Maduro -- as has Tehran. It is not exactly clear what the American strategy is, but there is no indication that the first moves were effective or well-received. The U.S. said that a telephone conversation between Maduro and a top State Department official, Roberta Jacobson, was aimed at improving relations, and there have been reports of other bilateral contacts. However, Maduro lashed out at reports that relations with Washington would improve after Chávez dies, calling it a distortion and manipulation by Washington. At about the same time, Iranian media reported a telephone call between Maduro and Ahmadinejad. The two are already friends. Maduro has strong connections with Tehran, having met in person with top officials on many occasions during visits to Iran and having served as their host when they traveled to Venezuela. Maduro is a favorite to succeed Chávez in both Tehran and Havana, not to mention Caracas. The Venezuelan constitution says if the president dies or cannot take office, the head of the National Assembly would take power temporarily. That position is held by another Chávez loyalist, Diosdado Cabello. After 30 days, a new election would take place. Cabello and Maduro are just two of several Chávez supporters who would vie for power in the factional power struggles to succeed the iconic president. Chávez’s unqualified blessing means that for now Maduro is the country’s most powerful man. He would benefit from an initial surge of support. And there is no question he and the Chavista forces have a firm grip on all the institutions of power. Chávez’s entrenched United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) will not crumble without its leader. And yet, there is no denying that Chavismo thrived because of Chávez. There is no guarantee it will survive without him in the long term, especially in the face of daunting economic problems, beginning with a budget deficit that stands at an astonishing 20 percent of GDP. For Washington, this means that forging ties with Maduro risks strengthening him against his rivals, helping him quash internal rivals and legitimize his rule at a time when it is unclear just how closely he and other Chavistas plan to follow the constitution. Infighting within the ruling party’s ranks, and the lack of a candidate with strong personal appeal, could open the way for the opposition. Opposition leader Henrique Capriles, who mounted a strong campaign against Chávez in last October’s presidential election, is on record saying he would bring a dramatic change in foreign policy, ending arms purchases from Russia, pulling away from China, reviewing oil deals that strengthen other authoritarian regimes in Latin America -- and rethinking controversial links with Iran. Washington would do well to keep conversations at the lowest possible volume, whether with the opposition or other would-be Chávez successors, while openly urging Venezuela to abide by democratic norms. If, in the event Chávez is unable to serve his term for whatever reason, a fair contest is allowed and enough time passes to loosen the emotional power of grief, the Venezuelan people may wake up to the dismal state of their economy, and discover there are better ways to decrease poverty and build lasting prosperity than Chavismo. A close relationship between Iran and Venezuela has always been a geographic and diplomatic oddity, one made possible only because of Chávez’s own worldview. Chávez’s immediate successor will seek to maintain it, but the intensity and impact will be difficult to preserve for long in a post-Chávez Venezuela.

## \*\*\*Legitimacy

## Heg---2nc doesn’t solve war

#### Empirics prove heg is useless

Mearsheimer, professor of political science – University of Chicago, 12/16/’10

(John, <http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/imperial-by-design-4576>)

U.S. grand strategy has followed this basic prescription for the past twenty years, mainly because most policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of Fukuyama’s and Krauthammer’s early analyses.

The results, however, have been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem, as is clear from James Madison’s observation that “no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.” Washington’s pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified.

To make matters worse, the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March 2003, more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.7 million more have been internally displaced. Moreover, the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts, despite all the phony talk about how the “surge” has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come, in fruitless pursuit of victory.

The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. Washington has worked overtime—with no success—to shut down Iran’s uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And the United States, unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. Finally, every post–Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict`; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel.

The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front, and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that “looking forward 50 years, only 33 percent of Americans think the United States will continue to be the world’s leading power.” Clearly, the heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism.

#### Can’t contain newer threats

G. John **Ikenberry** Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2010 38: 509 originally published online 10 May 2010 G. John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University, Korea. His forthcoming book is Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Triumph, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order 10. “The Liberal International Order and its Discontents” World Politics 61, no. 1 (20**09**): 5. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 38 (3)

 The sources of insecurity in world politics have also evolved since the early decades that shaped American liberal hegemony. As noted earlier, the threat to peace is no longer primarily from great powers engaged in security competition. The result has been a shift in the ways in which violence is manifest. In the past, only powerful states were able to gain access to the destructive capabilities that could threaten other societies. Today, it is possible to see technology and the globalisation of the world system as creating opportunities for non-state actors – or transnational gangs – to acquire weapons of mass destruction. As a result, it is now the weakness of states and their inability to enforce law and order within their own societies that provide the most worrisome dangers to the inter- national system. In contrast to earlier eras, there is no single enemy – or source of vio- lence and insecurity – that frames and reinforces the American-led liberal order. The United States and other states face a diffuse array of threats and challenges. Global warming, health pandemics, nuclear proliferation, jihadist terrorism, energy scarcity – these and other dangers loom on the horizon. Any of these threats could endanger Western lives and liberal ways of life either directly or indirectly by destabilising the global system upon which security and prosperity depend. Pandemics and global warming are not threats wielded by human hands, but their consequences could be equally devastating. Highly infectious disease has the potential to kill millions of people. Global warming threatens to trigger waves of environmental migration and food shortages, further destabilising weak and poor states around the world. The world is also on the cusp of a new round of nuclear proliferation, putting mankind’s deadliest weapons in the hands of unstable and hostile states. Terrorist networks offer a new spectre of non-state transnational violence. The point is that none of these threats are, in themselves, so singularly pre-eminent that they deserve to be the centrepiece of American national security as were anti-fascism and anti-communism in an earlier era.

#### No influence and can’t intervene

Conry, 97 - Foreign Policy Analyst @ Cato (Barbara, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-267.html>)

Other proponents of U.S. political and military leadership do not point to particular benefits; instead, they warn of near-certain disaster if the United States relinquishes its leadership role. Christopher paints a bleak picture: Just consider what the world would be like without American leadership in the last two years alone. We would have four nuclear states in the former Soviet Union, instead of one, with Russian missiles still targeted at our homes. We would have a full-throttled nuclear program in North Korea; no GATT agreement and no NAFTA; brutal dictators still terrorizing Haiti; very likely, Iraqi troops back in Kuwait; and an unresolved Mexican economic crisis, which would threaten stability at our border. [55] Gingrich has pronounced a future without American leadership "a big mess." [56]And former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher has warned, What we are possibly looking at in 2095 [absent U.S. leadership] is an unstable world in which there are more than half a dozen "great powers," each with its own clients, all vulnerable if they stand alone, all capable of increasing their power and influence if they form the right kind of alliance, and all engaged willy-nilly in perpetual diplomatic maneuvers to ensure that their relative positions improve rather than deteriorate. In other words, 2095 might look like 1914 played on a somewhat larger stage. [57] In other words, if America abdicates its role as world leader, we are condemned to repeat the biggest mistakes of the 20th century--or perhaps do something even worse. Such thinking is seriously flawed, however. First, to assert that U.S. leadership can stave off otherwise inevitable global chaos vastly overestimates the power of any single country to influence world events. The United States is powerful, but it still can claim only 5 percent of the world's population and 20 percent of world economic output. Moreover, regardless of the resources Americans might be willing to devote to leading the world, today's problems often do not lend themselves well to external solutions. As Maynes has pointed out, Today, the greatest fear of most states is not external aggression but internal disorder. The United States can do little about the latter, whereas it used to be able to do a great deal about the former. In other words, the coinage of U.S. power in the world has been devalued by the change in the international agenda. [58] Indeed, many of the foreign policy problems that have confounded Washington since the demise of the Soviet Union are the kinds of problems that are likely to trouble the world well into the next century. "Failed states," such as Somalia, may not be uncommon. But, as the ill-fated U.S. and UN operations in that country showed, there is very little that outside powers can do about such problems. External powers usually lack the means to prevent or end civil wars, such as those in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, unless they are willing to make a tremendous effort to do so. Yet those types of internecine conflicts are likely to be one of the primary sources of international disorder for the foreseeable future. Despite the doomsayers who prophesy global chaos in the absence of U.S. leadership, however, Washington's limited ability to dampen such conflicts is not cause for panic. Instability is a normal feature of an international system of sovereign states, which the United States can tolerate and has tolerated for more than two centuries. If vital American interests are not at stake, instability itself becomes a serious problem only if the United States blunders into it, as it did in Somalia and Bosnia. [59]

## Warming---2nc no extinction

#### Warming won’t cause extinction

Barrett, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, ‘7

(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

#### Experts agree

Hsu 10 (Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. <http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humans-survive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html>)

His views deviate sharply from those of most experts, who don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't foresee human extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-of-humanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker, a geochemist and renowned climate scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But Broecker remained skeptical that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity," Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain."

## Disease---2nc---no extinction

#### Modern medicine makes a pandemic 90% less lethal than 1918 – models prove

Madhav, principal analyst at catastrophe modeling firm AIR Worldwide, where she leads development of AIR's Pandemic Model, 3/5/2013

(Nita, “What if the 1918 Spanish Flu Happened Today?,” http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyId=533353677)

**Due to medical and tech**nological **advancements**, **fatality rates would** be almost **90 percent less than what was experienced during** the actual **1918** pandemic. However, increased global travel and an aging population would raise the death rate of a modern day Spanish flu pandemic by 30 percent and 8 percent, respectively, compared to the actual mortality rates in 1918. Taken together, **these modeling results suggest** that **dramatically fewer excess deaths** -- nearly 70 percent fewer than actually occurred in 1918 -- would result from a Spanish flu event today. In spite of this sharp decrease in mortality rates, the simulated modern-day Spanish flu event still disproportionately affects young adults. That can be attributed to the ability of the simulated virus to cause a cytokine storm, demonstrating the need for models to capture the effects of this complex syndrome.

# 1nr

## \*\*\*Politics

## 2NC Impact calc

#### nuclear shootouts because rationality breaks down

Griswold 5 – director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (Daniel, “Peace on earth? Try free trade among men,” 12-29-2005, http://www.freetrade.org/node/282)

Buried beneath the daily stories about car bombs and insurgents is an underappreciated but comforting fact during this Christmas season: The world has somehow become a more peaceful place.

As one little-noticed headline on an Associated Press story recently reported, "**War declining worldwide, studies say."** According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world has been in decline for the past half century. In just the past 15 years, ongoing conflicts have dropped from 33 to 18, with all of them now **civil conflicts within countries.** As 2005 draws to an end, no two nations in the world are at war with each other. The death toll from war has also been falling. According to the AP story, "The number killed in battle has fallen to its lowest point in the post-World War II period, dipping below 20,000 a year by one measure. Peacemaking missions, meanwhile, are growing in number." Those estimates are down sharply from annual tolls ranging from 40,000 to 100,000 in the 1990s, and from a peak of 700,000 in 1951 during the Korean War. Many causes lie behind the good news -- the end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy, among them -- but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role. Far from stoking a "World on Fire," as one misguided American author has argued, growing commercial ties between nations have had a dampening effect on armed conflict and war, for three main reasons. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend toward democracy, and democracies don't pick fights with each other. Freedom to trade nurtures democracy by expanding the middle class in globalizing countries and equipping people with tools of communication such as cell phones, satellite TV, and the Internet. With trade comes more travel, more contact with people in other countries, and more exposure to new ideas. Thanks in part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies -- a record high. Second, as national economies become more integrated with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war. Third, globalization allows nations to acquire wealth through production and trade rather than conquest of territory and resources. Increasingly, wealth is measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Those are assets that cannot be seized by armies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by trading away what they can produce best at home. Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace. Hot-blooded nationalism and ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. But deep trade and investment ties among nations make war less attractive. Trade wars in the 1930s deepened the economic depression, exacerbated **global tensions**, and helped to **usher in a world war.** Out of the ashes of that experience, the United States urged Germany, France and other Western European nations to form a common market that has become the European Union. In large part because of their intertwined economies, a general war in Europe is now unthinkable. In East Asia, the extensive and growing economic ties among Mainland China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is helping to keep the peace. China's communist rulers may yet decide to go to war over its "renegade province," but the economic cost to their economy would be staggering and could provoke a backlash among its citizens. In contrast, poor and isolated North Korea is all the more dangerous because it has nothing to lose economically should it provoke a war. In Central America, countries that were racked by guerrilla wars and death squads two decades ago have turned not only to democracy but to expanding trade, culminating in the Central American Free Trade Agreement with the United States. As the Stockholm institute reports in its 2005 Yearbook, "Since the 1980s, the introduction of a more open economic model in most states of the Latin American and Caribbean region has been accompanied by the growth of new regional structures, the dying out of interstate conflicts and a reduction in intra-state conflicts." Much of the political violence that remains in the world today is concentrated in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa -- the two regions of the world that are the least integrated into the global economy. Efforts to bring peace to those regions must include lowering their high barriers to trade, foreign investment, and domestic entrepreneurship. Advocates of free trade and globalization have long argued that trade expansion means more efficiency, higher incomes, and reduced poverty. The welcome decline of armed conflicts in the past few decades indicates that free trade also comes with its own peace dividend.

#### Turns disease – shutdown means we can’t detect a disease outbreak b/c the monitoring goes down

Emily Walker, 4-8-2011, "Both Sides Claim Win as Shutdown Averted," Med Page Today, http://www.medpagetoday.com/Washington-Watch/Washington-Watch/25826

The vast majority of employees at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) would be furloughed if the government ceased operations, said an HHS spokesman. Because the CDC tracks new public health threats such as disease outbreaks, the worst-case scenario during a shutdown would be a massive outbreak of a food-borne illness or other communicable disease. The CDC's emergency operation center -- a command center for monitoring and coordinating CDC's emergency response to public health threats in the United States and abroad -- will remain open. The center is currently working on responses to the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. But responses may be delayed, the spokesman said. "If a state were to call us and say 'We need help,' we may not be able to respond quickly," the spokesman said. While emergency workers will continue their jobs, the staff who work to "get people out the door," by booking travel and facilitating meetings, won't be working. "This would prevent us from responding as quickly as we'd like," the spokesman said. In addition, the CDC's ability to detect an outbreak could be jeapordized, he said. "We have a lot of disease surveillance networks. If those are scaled back to just the staff that monitor those networks, it could conceivably lead to us not being able to detect an outbreak as quickly as we'd like to. We simply won't have the manpower we have right now," the HHS spokesman said.

## Uniqueness

#### Shutdown won’t happen, but there’s still GOP fights

Blake 9/22 **–** Staff writers for the Washington Post (Sen. Mike Lee – there will be no shutdown, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/09/22/sen-mike-lee-there-will-be-no-shutdown/)

Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah), one of the leaders of the Defund Obamacare effort, assured Sunday that the effort will not lead to a government shutdown.¶ Asked point-blank about a potential shutdown, Lee said -- as he has said before -- that it won't come to that.¶ "No. We all know that the government is going to be funded. The questions is whether it will be funded with Obamacare or without," Lee said on NBC's "Meet the Press."¶ Lee and other supporters of the Defund Obamacare movement have said they will not support a budget that would fund the president's signature health care law. If Republicans stand by that pledge and won't support a budget that funds Obamacare -- something Democrats are insisting on -- it seems increasingly possible that Congress won't pass a budget by the deadline at the end of the month.

## Link

#### The plan would trade off with Congress’s ability to avert the shutdown - GOP has momentum and will, but they need literally every hour to get it done

Frank James, 9-13-2013, “Congress Searches For A Shutdown-Free Future,” NPR, http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/09/13/221809062/congress-searches-for-a-shutdown-free-future

The only thing found Thursday seemed to be more time for negotiations and vote-wrangling. Republican leaders recall how their party was blamed for the shutdowns of the mid-1990s and earnestly want to avoid a repeat, especially heading into a midterm election year. Cantor alerted members Thursday that during the last week of September, when they are supposed to be on recess, they will now most likely find themselves in Washington voting on a continuing resolution to fund the government into October. It looks like lawmakers will need every hour of that additional time. While talking to reporters Thursday, Boehner strongly suggested that House Republicans weren't exactly coalescing around any one legislative strategy. "There are a lot of discussions going on about how — about how to deal with the [continuing resolution] and the issue of 'Obamacare,' and so we're continuing to work with our members," Boehner said. "There are a million options that are being discussed by a lot of people. When we have something to report, we'll let you know."

## \*\*\*Oil

## 2NC Impact Overview—Russia

#### Link threshold is low

**IMF 12** (IMF Press Release No. 12/220, Statement by the 2012 Article IV Consultation Mission to the Russian Federation, June 13, 2012, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2012/pr12220.htm>)

“The Russian economy has recovered from the 2008-09 crisis and is now running close to its potential. High oil prices, strong wage growth, and robust consumption have supported demand. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate has fallen below 6 percent and capacity utilization in manufacturing has risen to its pre-crisis peak, suggesting that the remaining slack in the economy is small. While headline inflation slowed to 3.6 percent in May 2012, this owed mostly to a delay in administrative price increases and favorable food prices, and the IMF staff team’s measure of underlying inflation remains above 6 percent. “The outlook is for continued moderate growth and a rebound in inflation. Under unchanged policies, we project growth of about 4 percent both in 2012 and 2013. With the economy moving above potential, the supply-side factors muting prices reversing, and the exchange rate recently depreciating, inflation is projected to increase to around 6½ percent in 2012 and to remain at that level in 2013. “The ongoing turbulence in international markets is affecting Russia mostly through oil prices. The reliance on oil exports exposes Russia to declining oil prices, especially if accompanied by large capital outflows. The increased exchange rate flexibility has been a major policy advancement and is helping the Russian economy absorb external shocks, including spillovers from international developments.

#### **Causes miscalc—draws in the US**

David, Prof Poli Sci – Johns Hopkins University, ’99 (Steven, *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb)

AT NO TIME since the civil war of 1918 -- 20 has Russia been closer to bloody conflict than it is today. The fledgling government confronts a vast array of problems without the power to take effective action. For 70 years, the Soviet Union operated a strong state apparatus, anchored by the KGB and the Communist Party. Now its disintegration has created a power vacuum that has yet to be filled. Unable to rely on popular ideology or coercion to establish control, the government must prove itself to the people and establish its authority on the basis of its performance. But the Yeltsin administration has abjectly failed to do so, and it cannot meet the most basic needs of the Russian people. Russians know they can no longer look to the state for personal security, law enforcement, education, sanitation, health care, or even electrical power. In the place of government authority, criminal groups -- the Russian Mafia -- increasingly hold sway. Expectations raised by the collapse of communism have been bitterly disappointed, and Moscow's inability to govern coherently raises the specter of civil unrest. If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

## 2NC UQ Overview—$100

#### Oil prices stable over $100—key to Russian stability

**Adomanis 3/14** (MA-Russian and East European Studies at the University of Oxford, “Crude Oil Is Still Really Expensive, So Russia Will Probably Stay Stable,” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/03/14/crude-oil-is-still-really-expensive-so-russia-will-probably-stay-stable/>)

Judah, like many Russia watchers, highlights the oil price trap as a potential downfall for Putin. As the report says: As a result, the Kremlin now must rely on a much higher oil price in order to balance its budget. In 2007, $40 a barrel would have sufﬁced. By 2012, more than $110 was required. Should the price of oil now fall for any substantial length of time, **Russia could be forced to return to large scale borrowing, even cut beneﬁts or implement some form of austerity, thus** undermining support for the regime in the provinces and among low-wage earners. It is ironic, but **Putin’s support now depends** upon the one thing he cannot control: the price of oil. I fully agree that a substantial and sustained fall in the price of oil would be pretty damaging for Putin, just as a substantial and sustained increase in the yield on Treasury Bills would be a pretty serious problem for the United States or a substantial fall in soy prices would be a serious problem for Brazil. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to see that a substantial portion of Putin’s popularity rests on dolling out natural resource rents, and if those rents were suddenly to disappear then, yes, the Kremlin would be in real trouble. But you can look at almost any country in the world and imagine a scenario in which the increase or decrease in price of an important commodity or financial instrument would prove ruinous: they key question is how likely such a scenario is. So before we get too caught up in what might happen to Russia when oil prices decline, we should ask ourselves “how likely is it that oil prices are actually going to decline for any length of time?” Based on the available evidence I would say “extremely unlikely.” Consider the following charts. Here’s what has happened to the price for Brent crude since 1988, when Ronald Reagan was still fearlessly leading the free world to victory in the Cold War: The run-up in oil prices since 2000 doesn’t look like a temporary blip or an “accident,” it looks like increasingly expensive oil is just a fact of life for an increasingly dynamic and globalized world economy. So let’s focus on that post 2000 period, a period that, conveniently, coincides with the entirety of Vladimir Putin‘s time atop the Russian state: Since 2000, the only really noteworthy and sustained drop in world oil prices coincided with and was caused by an epochal financial crisis that very nearly crashed the entire global economy. Apart from that, oil prices have either been slowly increasing or holding steady. Indeed ever since oil prices really started to rebound towards the end of 2009 I have heard Russia watchers say “OK, oil is expensive now, and that helps Putin survive. But just wait until the price crashes, which is going to happen any day now!” They said this in 2010. They said this in 2011. They said this in 2012. And they’re saying it now in 2013. I suppose the oil price alarmists will be right at some point, we’re likely to eventually get another global recession that will crash commodity prices, but almost no one takes seriously the idea that commodities, and oil in particular, are just a lot more expensive now than they used to be and that this probably isn’t going to change any time soon. Is Russia’s over-reliance on oil a good thing, or is it somehow praiseworthy? No. If I were running the Kremlin I would be spooked by the increase in the non-oil and gas deficit and the ever rising price per barrel needed to balance the state budget. But the fact that a sustained and sharp decrease in the price of oil would be a disaster for the Kremlin doesn’t mean that such an decrease is any more likely. And if you look at the Energy Information Agency’s short-term price forecasts, the expectation in the short term is for an exceedingly gentle and gradual decline in oil prices to $108 a barrel in 2013 and $101 in 2014, while the long-term reference case is for a sustained and long-term rise in prices. Oil prices that are expected to average out at over $100 a barrel more than a year from now, and which will then begin a gradual rise, hardly seem like a harbinger of doom for the Kremlin. Perhaps I’m small-minded or unimaginative, but it’s very hard for me to conjur a scenario in which Putin’s political position is seriously threatened so long as oil is over $100 a barrel and in which the most likely scenario is for ever-rising price in the future. Could oil doom Putin? Yes. But it seems far more likely that, for better or worse, **it’s going to continue to function as a crutch for Russia’s current regime.**

## Venezuela Link—2NC

#### Plan causes oil price decline—overproduction and wipes out price control mechanisms

Butler 2013(Nick, Financial Times Energy Analyst, March 5, "Venezuela and the oil market after Chávez", http://blogs.ft.com/nick-butler/2013/03/05/venezuela-and-the-oil-market-after-chavez/?)

In the meantime, any new government will be desperate to sustain revenue and to see oil prices remain as high as possible. The power to achieve that, however, lies elsewhere and in economic terms, Venezuela is a price taker. They must deal at whatever price the market sets and in the end that means relying on the Saudis to maintain Opec discipline.Looking ahead, events in Venezuela put further downward pressure on the oil price. Almost any new government is likely to want to increase oil production and to encourage foreign involvement. The country’s resources are enormous and as Venezuelans move beyond the rhetoric of [the Chávez years](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3e0e5e04-992f-11e1-9a57-00144feabdc0.html) they may want to see greater investment, a return to a professional oil company and a new opening to the international market. Although it could take time to deliver, any material growth in output and exports would increase the pressures being felt within Opec from the rise in Iraqi production, which is already occurring. Global demand growth is not sufficient to absorb all the production available. As ever, the game will come back to the Saudis. In recent months, probably as a result of their increasing revenue needs, they appear to reset their desired price at something above $110. As production elsewhere grows, that level will become harder and harder to maintain.For the past decade the policies of Chávez have kept Venezuelan production and exports down and oil prices up. With his death, there is no guarantee that such policies or such an outcome will be maintained for long.

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#### The US should consult Brazil on Venezuela

Hakim 04 (Peter Hakim President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue) (“The Reluctant Partner” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2004), pp. 114-123, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033833)

Brazil's involvement in Venezuela, on the other hand, is likely to be a more important feature of U.S.-Brazil relations. For the past year, Brazil has chaired the "friends of Venezuela," a six-country group that includes the United States and has urged the Venezuelan government and insurgents to resolve their political differences peaceably by holding a constitutionally authorized recall vote on President Chavez's term. At the same time, however, Lula has pursued direct negotiations with the Chavez administration, to foster bilateral economic ties and closer integration among South American states. Brazil has managed this precarious double act so far, but should the situation in Venezuela deteriorate, Brasilia might have difficulty pursuing both tracks at once without alienating Washington.

#### Thefts of fissile material from new nuclear states means proliferation would be rapid

Busch 2004

Nathan E. Busch, assistant professor of political science at Christopher Newport University, 10/8/2004, “No End in Sight: The continuing menace of nuclear proliferation”, p. 290

Because there is no evidence that emerging NWSs will view MPC&A as a higher priority than current NWSs have, **it is quite likely that a further spread of nuclear weapons will increase risks that fissile materials will be stolen or diverted**, and will increase opportunities for the sabotage of nuclear facilities. In fact, the evidence from pre-2003 Iraq, North Korea, and Iran suggests that they may view issues such as safety and security as lower priorities than the current NWSs. In order to conceal the existence of their nuclear programs, these countries have adopted denial and deception techniques that could provide even greater obstacles to rigorous fissile material controls. By dispersing their WMD programs in numerous, often underground facilities, reducing or concealing their security systems, and moving WMD materials WMD materials to conceal them from inspectors or from an adversary’s military planners, the newly proliferating countries have managed to hide their programs fairly well. But it is less clear that they would be able to guarantee the security of these materials, particularly during times of domestic instability. As a result, a further spread of nuclear weapons would be likely to increase risks of thefts of materials, which **could lead to a rapid, destabilizing spread of nuclear weapons** and possibly increase the opportunities for nuclear terrorism.

#### No nuclear peace – not enough historical evidence

Russel 2003

Richard L. Russel, Professor of National Security Affairs at the National Defense University's Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, March 2003, “The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1

The nuclear optimists’ argument has escaped critical appraisal, in part, due to the lack of cases - fortunately, not yet anyway - of nuclear-armed nation-states fighting a major war to disprove the analysis. The lack of case studies, however does not prove the argument that the proliferation of nuclear weapons decreases the chances of - or even precludes - war between nation-states. One must recall that in the span of human history, the existence of nuclear weapons, about 58 years, is a very recent development. As Gaddis observes, ‘the archaeological evidence shows that men - and often women as well - have been fighting wars for at least 5,000 years’. It is sobering to recall that about 300 years were needed for gunpowder to become a mainstay in warfare. William McNeill noted that although gunpowder was available in the year 1000, the Chinese only began to exploit it in war around 11290, when the first true guns appear to have been invented. John Keegan observes that although the crossbow appeared in Europe at the end of the thirteenth century AD, it was not until the fourteenth century that it came into common use on the battlefield.

#### Optimist theory is too simplistic – can’t predict real-world cases

Busch 2004

Nathan E. Busch, assistant professor of political science at Christopher Newport University, 10/8/2004, “No End in Sight: The continuing menace of nuclear proliferation”, p. 313

**Having oversimplified the causes and motivations of state action, the optimists make highly inappropriate policy recommendations** regarding nuclear proliferation. Indeed, those recommendations go beyond what the optimists’ own theories **could possibly support**. In a context *other* than the proliferation debate, Waltz argues that his theories cannot predict specific policies or particular actions by individual states; instead, he maintains, they can predict only general trends. But, as Jeffrey Knopf has pointed out, when one is advocating further proliferation of nuclear weapons, predicting general trends is not enough: one must be certain that one’s theories are correct *all of the time*. It is likely that a certain awareness of the special dangers attending nuclear weapons policy leads Waltz to misapply his own realist theory and predict that NWSs will act rationally without exception. But that awareness must be replaced by fully conscious practical reasoning. Empirically grounded theories, combined with the prudence of the policymaker, would lead to policy recommendations that are more sound.

#### Brazil is the lynchpin of successful US policy in Latin America—only the counterplan can solve the aff—no solvency absent Brazil

Hirst (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004 [Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.60-61)

According to Brazilian diplomats, relations with the United States have finally achieved “political maturity.” Bilateral political communications have become straightforward, and they avoid problematic areas such as trade disputes, which contaminate the relationship as a whole. There is also a strong perception among Brazilian officials that political commonalties have expanded ever since Brazilian democracy consolidated.¶ U.S. government perceptions are that Brazil, like the rest of South American countries, has made major changes that should contribute to strengthening the relationship on both sides. As stated by a U.S. government official in 1997, “The U.S. relationship with South America goes far beyond trade and economics, of course. Our policy in the region aims to keep the United States economically strong and internationally competitive, to promote the principles of democracy, and to increase the level of regional cooperation to more easily deal with transnational threats of narcotrafficking, environmental degradation, and international crime.” 61 Yet in the United States there is a frequent perception among the public concerned with hemispheric affairs that “Brazil has a way to go before necessary reforms are deepened and institutionalized to the point that they provide a really firm, substantially irreversible guarantee of positive performance in the future.” 62¶ An evaluation of the relations with Brazil was prepared by a group of experts from the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations for the current Bush administration in February 2001 in which Brazil was considered “the fulcrum of any successful U.S. policy initiative in South America.” 63 Relations with Brazil were perceived as essential to influencing the economic and political future of the hemisphere. This task force also acknowledged that to deepen understanding between the two countries it would be necessary to review U.S. policy toward Brazil so as to “work together on vital matters such as trade, drugs, and regional security and move thereafter to engage in a high-level sustained and cooperative strategic dialogue with Brazilian leaders.” 64¶ Among its most relevant suggestions, the report stresses the importance of understanding mutual differences and it urges the United States to discard a policy of benign neglect toward Brazil. The importance of relations with Brazil was grounded in four criteria: “economic power; its central location within South America; its status as a trading partner and the recipient of U.S. investment; and its diplomatic role within South America and the international agencies.” 65 The study also warned both the United States and Brazil about the risk of missing the moment to build up a positive agenda. Though trade negotiations with the United States could be replaced by negotiations with the European Union, Brazil could not afford to lose preferential access to the American market. As well, both countries are perceived to play complementary roles in the promotion of economic reform and democratic stabilility in South America.